期刊文献+

政府部门绩效考核的博弈分析

下载PDF
导出
摘要 政府部门的绩效考核涉及多元利益主体,基于理性经济人的特性,上级领导与下级公务员、同级部门或个人、社会与政府为了获得更多利益而进行博弈,这些行为给绩效考核带来更多的负面影响,为此应规制和完善绩效考核。明确绩效考核目标为具体制度实施提供引领,同时完善绩效考核程序,规范上下级考核、同级考核评分标准,并建立以政府为主导、社会成员广泛参与的多元绩效考核模式,降低博弈率,提升考核功能。
作者 任泽娟
出处 《领导科学》 北大核心 2016年第12Z期12-14,共3页 Leadership Science
  • 相关文献

参考文献3

二级参考文献17

  • 1周志忍.当代政府管理的新理念[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,42(3):103-110. 被引量:66
  • 2Baker, George . Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement, Journal of Political Economy, 1992, 100(3). pp.598-614.
  • 3Hood, C. Public Service Management by Numbers. Why does it Vary? Where Has it Come From? What Are the Gaps and the Puzzles? Public Money and Management, 2007. 95-102.
  • 4Radnor, Zoe. Muddled, Massaging, Manoeuvring or Manipulated? International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, 2008,57 (4): 316-328.
  • 5Fisher, Colin and Bernadette Downes. Performance Measurement and Metric Manipulation in the Public Sector. Business Ethics. A European Review, 2008.17(3).
  • 6Hood, Christopher. Gaming in Target- world: The Targets Approach to Managing British Public Services. Public Administration Review, 2006.
  • 7Mears, Alex and Paul Webley. Gaming of Performance Measurement in Health Care: Parallels with Tax Compliance. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 2010,15(4): 236 - 242.
  • 8Behn, Robert. Cheating-Honest and Dishonest. The New Public Innovator, 1998.18- 19.
  • 9Courty, Pascal and Gerald Marschke. Dynamics of Per- formance Measurement Systems. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2003,19(2).
  • 10Bohte, John and Kenneth J. Meier. Goal Displacement: Assessing the Motivation for Organizational Cheating. Public Administration Review, 2000, 60 (2) :173-182.

共引文献44

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部