管理层权力视角下高管薪酬对股利政策的影响研究

Research on Impact of Executive Compensation on Dividend Policy Based on Managerial Power

薪酬激励理论经历了从最优契约论到管理层权力论的发展,合理的薪酬设计能够降低代理成本,促使高管将自由现金流以股利形式分配给股东。但随着管理层权力的扩大,高管薪酬本身可能也是代理问题的一部分。本文基于管理层权力视角,研究高管薪酬对股利政策的影响。研究发现,高管薪酬对现金股利支付水平有显著的正向影响,但管理层权力弱化了高管薪酬与现金股利支付水平的正相关关系。

The compensation theory experienced development from Contract Theory to Managerial Power Theory. Reasonable compensation contract design will reduce agency cost, and promote dividend payout to shareholders. But as the expansion of managerial power, managerial compensation itself can be part of the agency problems. From the perspectives of managerial power, this paper researches the impact of executive compensation on dividend policy. It is found that executive compensation has signif icantly positive influence on dividend payments, but managerial power will weaken the positive relationship between executive compensation and dividend policy.