摘要
并购后由谁来掌控被并购企业的经营权,是跨国并购谈判中讨论的核心议题之一。本文以2010年至2012年间中国企业跨国并购达成事件为研究对象,重点研究了交易参与者特征与并购治理模式选择之间的关系。研究表明,国有企业主导和私募基金参与,都对并购方获取被并购企业的经营权有负向影响。更进一步,相同行业正向调节私募基金参与对获得经营权的可能性的负向作用;文化相似性正向调节国有企业主导对获得经营权的可能性的负向作用。
Operation right,received extensive attention of academia and industry,is one of core issues in the cross-border M&A negotiations. This paper investigates the governance model of Chinese manufactural enterprises ’ cross-border M&A, using the data from 2010 to 2012 of Chinese enterprises cross-border M&A affairs as samples. Our conclusion reveals that,when the buyer is a state-owned enterprise instead of a private one,or when a private equity fund gets involved in the deal, it is less likely that the buyer gets the operation right. Further studies conclusively show that not only industry relatedness,but also culture similarities,has a negative moderating effect on the relationship of state-owned enterprise and possibility that the buyer gets the operation right.
出处
《珞珈管理评论》
CSSCI
2017年第4期15-28,共14页
Luojia Management Review
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目“我国跨国公司海外分支机构管控模式研究”(13BGL017)
“中国制造业企业跨国并购后整合路径与战略互补机制研究”(16BGL022)支持资助
关键词
跨国并购
经营权
国有企业
私募基金
Cross-border M&A
Operation right
State-owned enterprise
Private equity