连续统问题与薄实在论

The Continuum Problem and Thin Realism

哥德尔对连续统问题的独立性的柏拉图主义回应作为一种"厚实在论"招致麦蒂(Penelope Maddy)的一个批评。作为一种可能的替代,麦蒂提出了所谓的"薄实在论"。本文试图论证麦蒂对厚实在论的批评并不像表面上看来那么有力,而薄实在论作为一种本体论立场涉嫌一种自相矛盾,并且后者也不能像厚实在论那样赋予连续统问题以客观意义。

Kurt G?del's Platonic reaction to the independence of the continuum problem incurs a criticism from Penelope Maddy. As a possible replacement, Maddy proposes the socalled 'Thin Realism'. In this paper, the writer tries to argue that Maddy's criticism is not so powerful as it seems, and Thin Realism as an ontological stance, can be suspected of containing a kind of self-inconsistency. And particularly, Thin Realism cannot provide the continuum problem an objective sense as Robust Realism does.