商业信用融资与银行信贷融资的多重结构突变——基于面板门限的非线性关系分析

Multiple Structural Breaks between Trade Credit and Bank Credit: A Nonlinear Relationship Analysis Based on Threshold Panel Data Model

以2004-2015年中国A股制造业上市企业为样本建立面板门限模型。首先,基于信号理论探讨了商业信用融资与银行信贷融资之间为什么存在从替代到互补的转换特征,并对转换条件(门槛变量)进行逻辑构建与分析;其次,以信号效应边际递减与信号扭曲为逻辑,分析商业信用融资与银行信贷融资之间为什么会进一步呈现出从"强互补"到"弱互补"的二次突变特征;最后,结合所有制差异与产能差异,证明信号效应在我国信贷市场环境中不仅存在,而且还具有显著的异质性,即非SOE企业信贷融资与SOE企业相比更容易受信号效应激励,产能过剩企业的信贷融资与非过剩企业相比更容易受信号效应激励,说明信息不对称水平越高,商业信用作为一种信号机制越能缓解企业的信贷约束。创新之处在于以信号效应为核心对两种信用之间的多重结构突变进行逻辑阐述,并从体制和产能差异两个方面探索了信号效应在新兴市场下的异质性特征。

Using the panel data of A-share manufacturing listed companies covering period from 2004 to 2015 and threshold panel data model, this paper reveals:(1) the relationship between trade credit and bank loan takes on a nonlinear shift( from substitution to complementation, and finally to attenuation). The structural break of complementation originates from Signaling Effects, which argues the increase of trade credit use contributes to bank credit financing by means of signal incentive. The attenuation break proves the signaling effect has nature of diminishing marginal utility, which enriches the implications of the signaling effects by suggesting that the overexpansion of trade credits increase the risk aversion of banks and lead to the declining of bank loan supplies which in return give rise to the diminishing of complementary effects. The traditional signaling theory only emphasizes on the positive effect of commercial credit financing as a quality signal without describing the strength of the signaling effect in terms of its evolving features. By demonstrating the evolving process of the signal strength through dual-threshold analysis, the research not only enriches the connotation of the theory of signaling effect but extends the complementary theory from the traditional linear complementarity to nonlinear complementarity, hence providing micro logics to the convergence of the substitution theory and the complementary theory and expanding the boundary of the research on the signaling theory.(2) Firms with different institutional background have different signaling effects. Non-SOEs and firms with excess capacity are more dependent on the signaling effects to extend their bank credit financing because SOEs and firms without excess capacity are more likely to receive soft budgets, government's recessive guarantee as well as subsidy which behave as non-market mechanism and reduce the signaling effects, therefore, they take on lower strength of complementary effects.