摘要
多重监管的共同目标是确保监管主体之间产生协同效应,以及弥补客体治理机制的不足、保持市场竞争力,现有研究过于关注前者而忽视后者。本文选取1998年至2013年沪深两所上市公司,以XBRL(可扩展商务报告语言)财务报告的报送被财政部和证监会双重监管事件为研究对象,观察其对公司治理效应的影响。研究发现,公司目标函数不变时,自2008年应证监会(交易所)要求采用XBRL技术同步披露财务报告以来,公司应计盈余管理下降1.5%,真实盈余管理水平上升5.8%,公司会在两种操纵方法间权衡;2010年财政部以部分上市公司为试点介入监管,由于两个部委颁布的XBRL分类标准不同,增加了公司的转换成本和学习成本,双重管制公司的真实盈余管理水平高于其他公司4.0%,不具有资源优势的非国有公司真实盈余管理上升更显著(比国有公司高6.9%),治理效应下降。多重监管只加强了政府的责任意识,并未改善公司治理。本研究对如何加强多重监管及提升其对监管客体的治理效应有一定启示意义。
Dual or multi-sector regulations aim to integrate each regulator's resources to make up for clients' internal governance weakness, improving the competitiveness of the capital market. Prior researches mostly focus on these regulations themselves; little studies consider the interactions between regulation efficiency and clients' internal governance. In this paper, with the the perspective of corporation governance proxied by real earnings management, we argue this issue by testing the impact of XBRL(e Xtensible Business Reporting Language) implementation of suspected listed firms from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over 1998 to 2013 on dual regulation in China. We document that discretionary accruals are constrained by 1.5% while real earnings management boosts alternatively by 5.8% after the mandatory adoption of XBRL starting from 2008 required by China Securities Regulation Committee(CSRC), indicating the trade-off strategy of the management via two measures. Later, Ministry of Finance(MOF) also intervened the regulation officially with the establishment of its own standards beginning with several trials since 2010. The results show that listed firms subject to dual regulations experiencing poor corporation governance with a higher level of real earnings management increase(4.00%), probably for the extra learning burden and implementing cost derived from the different XBRL implementation standards. Moreover, the results further reveal that the increase of real earnings management is significant for that of non-state-owned enterprises(increased by 6.9%) in dual regulations, but not that of state-owned companies, which suggests the critical role of resources and government support in integrating information technology, such as XBRL implementation. In other words, XBRL implementation has distinct advantages over traditional disclosure. This also encourages managers to engage in their more opportunistic behaviors to maximize self-interest by manipulating earnings through real activities. Meanwhile, there is currently a shortage of opportunities for CSRC and MOF to work collaboratively. Our paper may be of particular interest to the sectors that try to improve the regulation effect as well as the corporation governance of the listed firms.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期50-63,共14页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金(71372016
71672009)
教育部博士学科点专项科研基金(201311010053)资助
关键词
XBRL
真实盈余管理
双重监管
治理效应
XBRL
Real Activities Manipulation
Dual Regulation
Sectional Interest