灵魂与理智的关系:从亚里士多德到阿奎那

Soul and Intellect:From Aristotle to Aquinas

在亚里士多德提纲挈领式论述中,灵魂与理智的关系蕴含着两种可能的诠释:一为主动理智甚或理智是外在于灵魂的独立实体;一为主动理智与被动理智均为灵魂之理智的能力表现。历经逍遥学派,及至阿拉伯亚里士多德主义者阿维森纳、阿威罗伊,理智的实体性诠释日渐加强,并最终形成了阿威罗伊主义"统一理智论"所主张的彻底"实体"化。然而,这一激进诠释路径对基督神学构成冲击,为此,阿奎那基于维护信仰权威的立场,对亚里士多德灵魂与理智关系的重新诠释,批驳了"实体"化倾向而转为"能力"诠释。依循"理智—灵魂"诠释的演进脉络,透过阿奎那对实体化诠释的批驳,彰显阿奎那对"理智灵魂"疑难的独到性化解。

Based on Aristotle’s discussion about the relationship between soul and intellect,there are two possible interpretations:some think that active intellect or even the whole intellect is an independent entity from the soul;the others insist that both active and passive intellect are the powers of rational soul.After Peripatetic,until the Arab Aristotelian Avicenna and Averroes,the first interpretation had being increasingly strengthened,and eventually formed the doctrine of Averroes'unity of intellect'which completely account the intellect as an'entity'.However,this interpretation is dangerous for the Christian theology,so in order to defend the faith,Aquinas reinterpreted the relationship between soul and intellect and refuted'entity'tendency while turned to the second interpretation.Following the intellect-Soul interpretation,the object is to highlight Aquinas’efforts for resolving the issue of'intellect-soul'.