期刊文献+

海德格尔《存在与时间》中的“共在”概念与“缺爱现象”兼及《黑皮本》的“直白称谓” 被引量:1

Heidegger’s Conception of Mitsein and His Insufficient Perspective of Love,also on the “Direct Naming” in His Black Notebooks
原文传递
导出
摘要 海德格尔反对把《存在与时间》解读为生存哲学,但人们的这种所谓'误读'事出有因:该书提供了生活现象学作为一般存在论的基础与出发点,其所实际呈现给我们的就是生活现象学。该书有意规避了'爱与友情'这一人生现象学上的重要环节,这明显地体现在他关于达在之共在的分析中,这一分析完全忽视了达在与其他达在在爱中直接相遇的可能性,他人(其他达在)仅被视为用具关系中显示自身的在者。同时,海德格尔对向死而在的分析也具有片面性,因为死亡不仅仅是'畏',而且也是爱的源泉。海德格尔的生活现象学的这些问题至少部分地解释了他后续思想,比如反映在《黑皮本》中的'纳粹'问题的政治失误。 Heidegger rejected a reading of his Being and Time as an existentialist philosophy.Such a reading is,however,not a total misreading,because Being and Time presents itself as a phenomenology of life as both the basis and starting point for his general theory of Being.In this presentation,Heidegger deliberately passed by love and friendship essential to human life.His analysis of being-with(Mitsein)ignores the possibility of a direct encounter of Dasein and other Dasein in love.Other Dasein shows itself only through Dasein’s everyday dealing with ready-to-hand things.Heidegger’s analysis of Being-towards-death is also one-sided because the mood accompanying death is not only anxiety(Angst)but can also be love.The one-sidedness of his phenomenology of life partly explains his political alignment with Nazi regime,and gets exacerbated in his Black Notebooks.
作者 靳希平 JIN Xiping
机构地区 北京大学哲学系
出处 《伦理学术》 2018年第2期124-139,共16页 Academia Ethica
关键词 生活现象学 达在 共在 爱与死 Phenomenology of Life Dasein Being-with Love and Death
  • 相关文献

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部