“概念的劳作”是正当的吗?——在跨文化哲学视野中对黑格尔正义概念的思考

Is the “Work of the Concept”Just? Reflections on Hegel’s Concept of Justice in the Perspective of Intercultural Philosophy

本文把'正义'主题与一种非常特殊的实践类型——即概念的实践——关联起来。没有这种概念性—论证性的实践活动,哲学,尤其是欧洲哲学将难以设想。在此需要追问的是,如果说黑格尔哲学宣称通过'概念的劳作'就能把握'真理',那么它对待其他哲学与(非欧洲的)文明的方式是否'公正'?黑格尔认为,以示范性的方式,系统性的问题应该依据'真理'与'正义'的关系来处理。基于对问题理解的多样性,本文着眼于哲学中'沟通'所发挥的作用,以此论证:从跨文化的视角来看,黑格尔哲学本身并非不合理,但是它不能保护我们免受不合理的论断的侵扰。

The paper will relate the theme of'justice'to a very specific type of practice:the'practice of concepts',i.e.,that kind of conceptual-argumentative activity,without which philosophy,especially in Europe,is hard to understand.The question is whether Hegelian philosophy,which claims to grasp the'truth'through the'work of the concept',does'justice'to other philosophies and foreign(non-European)cultures.In an exemplary way,Hegel will figure out a systematic problem regarding the relationship between'truth'and'justice'.Starting from a more differentiated understanding of the problem with regard to the role of'communication'in philosophy,it should be argued for the theme that Hegel’s philosophy in an intercultural perspective is not unfair per se,yet it cannot protect us from unfair judgments.