创业板上市公司的盈余质量更低么?——板块比较与动态分析视角

Is Earnings Quality of Companies Listed on GEM Lower?From the Perspectives of Segment Comparison and Dynamic Analysis

通过提高盈余质量以保护中小投资者利益,这既是监管政策出台的初衷,也是信息不对称分析框架下的公司治理所研究的重要话题。以"退市新规"的出台为契机,选取2009-2012年A股上市公司为样本,从横向比较与纵向变化两个维度研究创业板上市公司的盈余质量。结果发现,退市新规出台之前,主板上市公司的盈余质量高于中小板和创业板公司,而中小板和创业板公司的盈余质量在多数年份上并无显著差异。在变化动态上,A股上市公司在"退市新规"出台当年的盈余质量显著高于新规出台前的水平。其中,创业板上市公司的盈余质量正在逐年改善,各板块之间的盈余质量差异随着新规的出台迅速缩小。平均看来,主板上市公司倾向于向下盈余管理,创业板上市公司倾向于向上盈余管理,而中小板公司的盈余管理方向不太明确。研究发现有助于客观认识创业板上市公司的盈余质量,也能为外部治理机制对中小投资者的保护作用提供经验支持。

To protect small investors by improving earnings quality is not only the purpose of the regulatory policies,but also an important research topic in corporate governance under the framework of asymmetric information. With the introduction of new regulations on delisting,we choose a sample of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2012,and study earnings quality of the companies listed on growth enterprise market( GEM) from perspectives of horizontal comparison and dynamic analysis. The findings show that before the issuance of delisting regulations,earnings quality of companies listed on the Main Board is higher than that of the companies listed on GEM and Small Plates,and earnings quality of the firms listed on Small Plates is not different from that of firms listed on GEM. In the year of the issuance of delisting regulations,the absolute values of discretionary accruals of A-share listed companies is significantly lower than those in previous years. Especially,accrual-based earnings quality of GEM has been gradually improved,and the gap of earnings quality among different trading segments become narrow. On average,companies listed on Main Board tend to choose downward earnings management,and companies listed on GEM tends to choose upward earnings management; however,the overall direction of earnings management among the companies listed on Small Plates is not clear. The findings help us understand the earnings quality of companies listed on GEM,and also provide empirical evidence about the effectiveness of external governance mechanisms in protecting small investors.