关系型交易、内部控制与盈余管理——基于应计与真实盈余管理的经验证据

Relationship-Based Transaction,Internal Control and Earnings Management:Empirical Evidence from Accrual and Real Earnings Management

与以往单纯从内部控制这一规则治理机制出发研究盈余管理的文献不同,引入关系型交易这一关系治理机制,探讨两种不同的治理机制及其交互作用对上市公司应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理行为的影响。检验结果表明,随着供应商/客户关系交易比例的增加,上市公司进行正向应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的程度越严重;进一步研究发现,高质量内部控制有助于抑制供应商关系型交易诱发的正向应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理,但是对客户关系型交易诱发的应计/真实盈余管理无显著影响。

Different from previous papers which focus on earnings management only from the perspective of internal control,we introduce relationship-based transactions and investigate the two different governance mechanisms( relationship-based transactions and internal control) and their mutual influence on accrual and real earnings management. The empirical results show that income-increasing earnings management and real earnings management are positively related to the proportion of transactions between main suppliers and customers. Further,we find that higher-quality internal control helps constrain the incomeincreasing earning management and real earnings management induced by the supplier relationship-based transactions,while has no significant inhibitory action on the income-increasing earning management and real earnings management induced by the customer relationship-based transactions.