分析师盈利预测压力与企业投资效率——来自中国A股市场的证据

Earnings Pressure from Securities Analysts' Forecast and Inefficient Investment:Evidence from Chinese A-share Market

证券分析师盈利预测是市场预期的一个典型替代变量,其超出企业内部经营预期的部分会对企业产生压力,从而干扰经理人的决策和行为。通过构建盈利预测压力测算模型研究证券分析师盈利预测压力对企业投资决策的影响,并进一步考察分析师跟踪和企业政治联系对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现,分析师盈利预测压力与投资不足正相关,与过度投资不相关。这表明企业在面临分析师盈利预测压力时更倾向于减少投资,而不是冒险将资金用于高风险项目。进一步研究发现,分析师跟踪以及企业政治关联会负向调节盈利预测压力对投资不足行为的影响,外部监督的增强以及资源获取渠道的拓宽能够纠正企业在盈利预测压力下的非效率投资行为。

Securities analysts' earnings forecast is believed to be a typical substitution for market expectation. When securities analysts' earnings forecast exceeds internal expectations,it will pose a pressure on management and cause inefficient investment behaviors.Using the estimation model of earnings pressure from securities analysts' forecast,this paper examines management's investment behaviors when facing earnings pressure caused by securities analysts' forecasts,and how this relationship is affected by analysts following and political connections. The empirical result shows such pressure may lead to under-investment but not over-investment. This indicates that management prefers to cut down investment and allocates more resources to current business when facing earnings pressure,rather than making investments into risker projects. Further study finds that this effect is weakened by analysts' following and political connections,meaning that external monitoring and the widened financing channel can mitigate the investment inefficiency caused by analysts' earnings forecasts.