CEO的动态过度乐观影响费用粘性吗?

Does the Dynamic Over-optimism of CEO Affect Cost Stickiness?

现有研究发现,CEO的过度自信通过乐观预期这一机制提高费用粘性。CEO的动态过度乐观源于过度自信,但与其存在很大区别:动态过度乐观的CEO会努力工作以实现对未来的乐观预期,从而提升企业价值,增强了CEO与股东之间的利益协调度,因而可能通过减少管理者机会主义行为抑制费用粘性。文章利用2007—2016年A股上市公司数据检验并支持了上述推断。进一步通过区分CEO动态过度乐观与静态过度自信、稳健操作和披露、盈余管理以及业绩状态等证实了动态过度乐观的独特之处,从宏观经济环境和公司治理机制两个角度验证了动态过度乐观影响费用粘性的主要机制是减少管理者机会主义行为。文章不仅为高管特征与企业费用粘性的关系提供了新证据,而且也有助于投资者通过管理层特征判断企业费用粘性问题,从而更好地做出决策。

Extant researches find that CEO’s over-confidence can increase cost stickiness via the path of optimistic expectation.CEO’s dynamic over-optimism results from over-confidence but differs from it:CEO with dynamic over-optimism would make every effort to work in order to achieve his/her optimistic expectation about future,and hence increases firm’s value.It indicates that the alignment of interests between CEO and shareholders increases,and CEO’s opportunism decreases,which in turn will decrease cost stickiness.This paper examines the preclusion based on the data from A-share listed firms during the period from 2007 to 2016 and the result supports it.This paper also provides evidence on the unique feature of CEO’s dynamic over-optimism by differentiating it from CEO’s static over-confidence,conservative operation or disclosure,earnings management and status of firm’s performance.Cross-sectional analysis from both macroeconomic circumstance and corporate governance provides further evidence that the main mechanism on decreasing cost stickiness of CEO’s dynamic over-optimism is to reduce opportunism.This research not only provides the new evidence for the relationship between CEO characteristic and cost stickiness,but also helps investors in better understanding the issue of firms’cost stickiness and thus make a better decision.