财务总监兼任董秘与内部人交易

CFO with Additional Post as Board Secretary and Insider Trading

基于2007—2016年中国A股上市公司数据,文章分析并检验了财务总监兼任董秘对公司内部人交易盈利能力的影响。研究发现,财务总监兼任董秘会显著抑制公司内部人交易的获利能力;进一步分析发现,财务总监抑制内部人交易的作用主要存在于民营企业和非两职合一样本组中;基于财务总监个体异质性特征分析发现,这种抑制作用主要存在于男性和年龄较高的样本中;基于交易特征分析发现,这种抑制作用主要集中在内部人卖出样本,且不受内部人交易金额的影响。

Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this paper explores the impact of CFO’s additional post as board secretary on the profitability of insider trading both theoretically and empirically.The results show that the additional posts will significantly restrain the profitability of corporate insider trading.The cross-sectional analyses find that the CFO’s restraining role in the insider trading mainly exists in the non-SOE and non-dual samples.The test of the CFO’s own features shows that the above findings mainly exist in the male or the elder samples.Furthermore,the analysis of trading characteristics shows that the impact of the CFO’s additional post as board secretary prevailingly exists in the insider selling samples,and there is no difference between the big and small trading.