反收购条款、机构投资者与股价信息含量

Anti-takeover Provision,Institutional Investor and Information Content of Stock Price

文章采用2008—2016年A股上市公司数据,研究反收购条款如何通过机构投资者的持有渠道和交易渠道影响公司股价信息含量。实证结果表明,反收购条款会降低机构投资者的持有比例和交易比例,进而降低股价信息含量。将机构投资者分为稳定型和交易型后发现,反收购条款对稳定型机构投资者的影响主要体现在持有渠道,对交易型机构投资者的影响主要体现在交易渠道。进一步分组检验发现,在股权集中度低的公司、民营公司及法律环境差的地区,反收购条款的上述作用更大。

This article uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2016 to explore how anti-takeover provisions affect the information content of stock price through the institutional investors’holding channels and trading channels.The empirical results indicate that anti-takeovers provisions will reduce the holding and transactions proportion of institutional investors,and then reduce the information content of stock price.After dividing institutional investors into stable institutional investors and transactional institutional investors,this article also finds that the effect of anti-takeovers provisions is mainly reflected in the holding channels for the stable institutional investors,while in the trading channels for the transactional institutional investors.The further division of samples results that the above effects of anti-takeovers provisions are more significant in companies with low ownership concentration,private companies,and regions with poor legal environment.