董事会治理机制、管理者过度自信和会计稳健性——基于两类会计稳健性视角

Board Governance Mechanism,Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism:A Perspective of Two Types of Accounting Conservatisms

文章利用中国沪深A股上市公司2012—2017年数据,研究发现,管理者过度自信与企业的条件稳健性和非条件稳健性都呈负相关关系,即管理者过度自信会降低企业的条件稳健性和非条件稳健性;进一步研究发现,董事会治理机制的完善能弱化管理者过度自信对企业条件稳健性的影响,但不能弱化管理者过度自信对企业非条件稳健性的影响。文章在厘清管理者过度自信与两类会计稳健性关系的基础上,探究董事会治理机制的完善对两者关系的影响,进而提出相关建议,以期为提高上市公司会计稳健性、保护投资者利益提供新思路。

This paper conducts empirical analysis based on the data from 2012 to 2017 of A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange.The research finds that a negative correlation has been established between managerial overconfidence and conditional as well as unconditional conservatism,i.e.the managerial overconfidence will reduce both conditional and unconditional conservatism of companies.By conducting further research,we find that the improved board governance mechanism can weaken the impact of managerial overconfidence on the conditional conservatism of companies,whereas it cannot weaken the impact of managerial overconfidence on unconditional conservatism.In summary,this paper clarifies the relationship between the managerial overconfidence and two types of accounting conservatism,tests the effect of the board governance mechanism on the relationship,and finally provides a new approach for both improving the accounting conservatism of listed companies and protecting the interest of investors.