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打开中美关系进程中的周恩来——来自尼克松外交档案的新证据 被引量:4

Zhou Enlai in the Sino-American Rapprochement:New Evidence from the Nixon Archives
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摘要 本文主要依据的材料为美国新解密的尼克松外交档案文件:基辛格、尼克松与周恩来会谈记录。1971年至1972年,中美双方相继举行了高层会谈和峰会,为实现两国关系和解做准备。周恩来几乎参加了所有与美方的会谈,双方探讨的内容广泛而透彻,就台湾、印支问题,以及与苏联、印度、日本关系问题达成了不少共识、默契,乃至合作意向。在会谈中,双方互相"出牌",周恩来以总统连任、日本威胁、访华成果等牌回应基辛格的台湾、中国入联等牌。在两个中国、一中一台、一个中国两个政府、台独,以及日本与台湾地位未定论的关系等问题上,周可以说是步步紧逼,要求获得美方符合中方原则的明确承诺。周并巧妙地向美方通报英国政府此时所表示的对台湾问题的认识,一方面促美在台问题上做出让步,一方面为公报的用词提供了一种思路。与此同时,周对美国从台湾撤军后日军进驻台湾问题及苏日关系问题非常敏感,反复要求美方就阻止日军进入台湾做出承诺,甚至主张美军暂留台湾,以防日军进入。在印支问题上,周除了帮助越南促美让步外,还不得不从美国方面了解越美和谈的进展情况,反映了中越关系裂痕的加深。美方在越美和谈中的让步,显示出周所作说服工作的效应,但由于此让步发生在基辛格两次访华之间,即令敏感的越南人生出中美拿越南做交易的疑虑。中方一方面强调美中都不应向外国派驻军队的立场,一方面又为越南不从柬埔寨撤军辩解,实际陷入到撤军问题上双重标准之嫌的尴尬之中。另外,基辛格并明确表示不要求中国停止援越,周则承诺不派地面作战部队入越。双方一方面在印巴关系和南亚问题上确立合作对抗苏印的具体步骤,一方面又小心谨慎地回避两国结成反苏政治联盟的问题,避免遭人诟病,反映了中方无法摆脱的革命与务实,即外交关系中意识形态标准和国家利益标准之间的矛盾。美方对周在会谈中表现的谈判艺术评价甚高,周则每每强调毛对会谈的领导作用。 This article is primarily based on the recently-declassified American archival documents,including the memorandums of conversation between Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon,and Zhou Enlai.From 1971 to 1972,Chinese and American leaders held a series of high-level talks and summit meetings to prepare for the improvement of Sino-American relations.Zhou Enlai attended nearly all the meetings with the Americans. The two sides discussed a wide range of issues including Taiwan,Indochina,the Soviet Union,India,and Japan.They reached a number of mutual understandings,tacit agreements as well as willingness for future cooperation.During the negotiations,both sides put their concerns and agendas on the table.When Kissinger raised the questions of Taiwan and China's membership in the United Nations,Zhou Enlai responded by discussing the issues of President Nixon's re-election,the Japanese threat,and the possible results of Kissinger's visit to China.On the thorny issues such as'two Chinas,''one China and one Taiwan,''two governments in one China,''Taiwan independence,'and'the undecided relations between Taiwan and Japan,'Zhou pressured the Americans to make clear commitments and promises in line with the Chinese principles.Zhou adroitly informed the United States of the British government's position on the Taiwan Question in order not only to persuade the Americans to make concessions on the Taiwan Question but also to offer a method for the wording of the communique.Zhou also showed his concern over both the possibility of Japanese stationing troops in Taiwan after the withdrawal of American soldiers and Soviet-Japanese relations.Insisting that the United States promise to prevent Japan from sending troops to Taiwan,Zhou even proposed that the American forces stay in Taiwan temporarily to block the entry of Japanese troops.On the issue of Indochina,Zhou helped North Vietnam to pressure the United States to make concessions.The fact that Zhou had to obtain information about the progress of the Vietnamese-American peace talks from the U.S.side indicates the deepening gap in Sino-Vietnamese relations.The concessions that the United States made in the American-Vietnamese peace talks demonstrate Zhou's persuasive power.But because the American concessions occurred between Kissinger's two visits to China,they made the sensitive Vietnamese suspect that China and the United States used Vietnam as bargaining chips in their negotiations.China actually found itself in the dilemma of following a double-standard on the issue of withdrawal of foreign troops because on the one hand China emphasized that neither the United States nor China should send troops to foreign countries,on the other hand it tried to defend North Vietnam's decision not to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.In addition, Kissinger made clear that the United States would not demand the suspension of Chinese assistance to North Vietnam,and Zhou,for his part,promised that China would not dispatch ground combat troops to North Vietnam.In the area of Indian-Pakistan relations, China and the United States established concrete steps of cooperation to oppose the Soviet Union and India.In the meantime,they carefully avoided the issue of creating an anti-Soviet political alliance between China and the United States for the fear that such an effort might be criticized by other countries.Zhou's negotiations with the Americans reveal contradictions in Chinese foreign policy,contradictions between revolutionary commitment and geopolitical realism,between ideological standards and national interest requirements. The American side highly praised Zhou's negotiation skills while Zhou always stressed Mao's leadership role in the negotiations.
作者 李丹慧
出处 《冷战国际史研究》 2008年第2期141-200,10,共62页 Cold War International History Studies
基金 国家社会科学基金项目"冷战与中苏同盟研究"(05BSS005)的阶段性研究成果 上海重点学科建设项目资助(B406)
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