发电侧电力竞争中价格垄断力的判据

CRITERIA OF MONOPOLY POWER ON MARKET PRICE IN GENERATION MARKETS

在负荷刚性的发电侧电力市场中 ,市场成员 (即发电商 )可能拥有对价格的垄断控制能力。在市场均衡理论的基础上 ,文中对发电商的申报价格与其收益之间的关系进行了分析。分析表明 ,如果发电商拥有较多的发电容量时 ,它就有可能抬高电价并获得超额利益。同时 ,文中还提出了一个判断发电商市场价格垄断力的方法。该判断方法不仅能够被用来确定不同发电商的较为合理的发电容量 ,防止它们由于拥有较大的发电容量而具有价格控制能力 ,而且能够对交易者申报中的投机行为进行监管 ,以确保市场竞争的正常进行。

In generation markets with fixed load demands, the market participants might hold monopoly control power to settlement prices. In the conditions of equilibrium, the relationships between one participant's bidding prices and its profits are analyzed in this paper. The results illustrate that the market participant can increase its profits by increasing its bidding price in some conditions. Furthermore, a kind of criteria is obtained to verdict whether the participant owns the monopoly control power to settlements prices. This method can be applied to determine a reasonable generation capacity of each power company during power systems restructuring. Moreover, it can be used to monitor the illegal bidding strategies of traders to ensure the competition in generation markets. The numerical results show that the monopoly control power of each participant is different in different loads demand.