经理行为与企业业绩关系模型研究

On Managerial Effort and Performance Model

在研究经理报酬激励的文献中 ,经常提到要避免经理的短期行为、激励经理付出长期努力来增强企业的长期竞争力。但将其以模型的形式表述并加以分析的文献却很少 ,有的文献提出的模型形式也较为复杂。本文在委托——代理理论框架下 ,通过研究经理的努力选择对于企业业绩的影响问题 ,按照经理行为性质不同 ,重新提出了一种既简单又实用的经理行为与企业业绩的关系模型。

Researches on managerial compensation incentives often mention the issue of eliminating managerial short-term effect and motivating managers to work hard for long term benefits However,few have modeled this idea For the few models that exist, they are too complicated Under the framework of principal-agent theory,this paper puts forward a new model of managerial effort and firm performance This model is both simple and practical