摘要
本文通过对一般情况及引入承诺行动后小股东起诉代表大股东利益董事的博弈分析 ,提出一种保护中小股东利益的有效机制 ,从而在一定程度上减少上市公司董事会在制定企业经营方案、投资计划、股利分配方案及其他政策时出现偏袒大股东、侵犯小股东利益的情况。
Based on the game analysis of about the small shareholders' accusation of the board members on behalf of the big shareholders' interest under normal circumstances and the introduction of commitment, an effective mechanism to protect the interest of the small shareholders is introduced in this paper. This will stop the violation of the small shareholders' interest and inclination to the interest of the big shareholders when the board makes projects of operation, investment, bonus distribution and other policies.
出处
《同济大学学报(社会科学版)》
2003年第2期89-92,共4页
Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition
关键词
股东利益
起诉
承诺行动
博弃
Shareholder's Interest
Litigation
Commitment
Game