期刊文献+

企业集团税后利润的优化问题

Optimization of Group's Profit-After-Tax
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摘要 研究一个既有内部关联交易又有外部交易的企业集团如何对税后利润总额进行优化的问题·以转移价格、运输费用分配率、内部交易次数、外部交易次数及交易量为决策变量,建立了企业集团税后利润优化模型·并且考虑了库存占用资金受约束条件下的经济订货批量,将对转移价格的研究与对库存管理的研究做了结合·最后应用进化规划算法做了仿真计算,结果表明企业集团的税后利润可以通过有关变量的调整来优化· ?A profitaftertax optimization of a group with both affiliated trade and external trade was discussed. A model for optimizing profitaftertax was established. The decision variables are transfer price,transportation cost allocation rate,times of affiliated trade,times and quantity of external trade. The economic order quantity was considered on condition that the capital invested in inventory was restricted. The research on transfer price and the research on inventory management were combined. An evolutionary programming algorithm was used to do the simulation. The results show that the group's profitaftertax can be optimized by adjusting the decision variables.
出处 《东北大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2003年第5期499-502,共4页 Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金 辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目(9910200208)
关键词 企业集团 转移价格 税后利润 优化 进化规划 group transfer price profit-after-tax optimization evolutionary programming
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参考文献12

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二级参考文献8

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