摘要
建立了寡头垄断条件下的排污权交易博弈模型 ,分析了具有不同生产成本和治污成本的寡头企业在政府发放不同数量的许可证时的交易均衡 .证明了在特定情况下允许排污权交易并不一定有益 ,反而可能导致低产出率和高价格的市场均衡 ,并可能导致产品由低成本企业向高成本企业迁移 。
A game model of tradable emission permits under conditions of duopoly is established based on the Cournot game model. The equilibrium is analyzed between firms which have different production cost and pollution controlling cost while given different amount of emission permits by governments. It is proved that in some special cases tradable emission permits will not result in much advantage, but equilibrium with low output capacity and high price. Besides, it may result in higher production of firms whose cost is higher, and lower productions of firms whose cost is lower.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第4期27-31,123,共6页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金 (60 0 740 3 3 )
中国高等学校博士点基金 (2 0 0 2 0 4870 46)
