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Modeling cascading failures and mitigation strategies in PMU based cyber-physical power systems 被引量:9

Modeling cascading failures and mitigation strategies in PMU based cyber-physical power systems
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摘要 This paper presents a model of cascading failures in cyber-physical power systems(CPPSs) based on an improved percolation theory, and then proposes failure mitigation strategies. In this model, the dynamic development of cascading failures is divided into several iteration stages. The power flow in the power grid, along with the data transmission and delay in the cyber layer, is considered in the improved percolation theory. The interaction mechanism between two layers is interpreted as the observability and controllability analysis and data update analysis influencing the node state transformation and security command execution. The resilience indices of the failures reflect the influence of cascading failures on both topological integrity and operational state. The efficacy of the proposed mitigation strategies is validated, including strategies to convert some cyber layer nodes into autonomous nodes and embed unified power flow controller(UPFC) into the physical layer. The results obtained from simulations of cascading failures in a CPPS with increasing initial failure sizes are compared for various scenarios.Dynamic cascading failures can be separated into rapid and slow processes. The interdependencies and gap between the observable and controllable parts of the physical layer with the actual physical network are two fundamental reasons for first-order transition failures. Due to the complexity of the coupled topological and operational relations between the two layers, mitigation strategies should be simultaneously applied in both layers. This paper presents a model of cascading failures in cyber-physical power systems(CPPSs) based on an improved percolation theory, and then proposes failure mitigation strategies. In this model, the dynamic development of cascading failures is divided into several iteration stages. The power flow in the power grid, along with the data transmission and delay in the cyber layer, is considered in the improved percolation theory. The interaction mechanism between two layers is interpreted as the observability and controllability analysis and data update analysis influencing the node state transformation and security command execution. The resilience indices of the failures reflect the influence of cascading failures on both topological integrity and operational state. The efficacy of the proposed mitigation strategies is validated, including strategies to convert some cyber layer nodes into autonomous nodes and embed unified power flow controller(UPFC) into the physical layer. The results obtained from simulations of cascading failures in a CPPS with increasing initial failure sizes are compared for various scenarios.Dynamic cascading failures can be separated into rapid and slow processes. The interdependencies and gap between the observable and controllable parts of the physical layer with the actual physical network are two fundamental reasons for first-order transition failures. Due to the complexity of the coupled topological and operational relations between the two layers, mitigation strategies should be simultaneously applied in both layers.
出处 《Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy》 SCIE EI 2018年第5期944-957,共14页 现代电力系统与清洁能源学报(英文)
基金 supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51537010) the National Key Basic Research Program(973 Program)(No.2013CB228206) the project of ‘‘The up layer design for DC-AC hybrid grids system protection’’(No.XT71-16-053)
关键词 CYBER physical power system CASCADING failure Improved PERCOLATION theory Interdependent network MITIGATION strategy Cyber physical power system Cascading failure Improved percolation theory Interdependent network Mitigation strategy
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