摘要
构建了我国基本医疗保险体系的简化模型 ,分析了个人的收入弹性与医疗保险费用公平性之间的关系 ,讨论了基本医疗保险体系中针对所有消费者的最优共保率的确定方法和计算公式 .在确定最优共保率的条件下 ,能有效地解决基本医疗保险体系中的道德风险问题 ,在满足人们分散疾病风险要求的同时 ,减少其对医疗服务的过度使用 。
This paper established a model of fundamental health insurance system in China. Based on the model, it analyzed the relationship between personal income elasticity and health insurance fee, and then discussed the formulation and the method of deciding the optimal coinsurance rate including all consumers. Undoubtedly, this method is helpful in solving moral hazard problems of fundamental health insurance system. In addition, it can meet the need of dispersing the risk of illness, reduce the consumers' overuse of medical service, and control the over growth of medical expenditure.
出处
《上海交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第4期593-595,共3页
Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 0 0 3 0 0 5 )
关键词
基本医疗保险
道德风险
最优共保率
fundamental health insurance
moral hazard
optimal coinsurance rate