摘要
运用委托代理理论 ,通过对我国经济管理体制改革过程中一些组织激励失灵的深层原因的数理分析 ,揭示了传统评价方法的缺陷 ,提出了设置双激励强度的观点 。
The principal agent theory is used to carry out a normative analysis of the indepth causes of incentive failure in some organization in the process of economic management system reforms in our country, thereby revealing the defects of the traditional evaluation methods and suggesting a new viewpoint of setting double incentive intension coefficient so as to revise relative defects of the traditional evaluation methods.
出处
《西安理工大学学报》
CAS
2002年第4期411-415,共5页
Journal of Xi'an University of Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金创新研究群体基金资助项目 (70 1 2 1 0 0 1 )