摘要
普京执政后进行经济政策调整,特别是惩治私有化过程中的严重腐败,采取措施打击金融寡头的违法掠夺,促使俄罗斯长期萧条后出现了经济复苏。从经济理论与实践的角度分析俄罗斯新型权贵寡头崛起的过程,可看到前苏联党政官僚和企业经理的蜕变,还有西方产权理论和改革药方的误导,是私有化中滋生严重腐败的重要原因,普京惩治腐败未能解决深层次矛盾,未来俄罗斯的政治经济走向充满变数。
The author discusses how Putin made adjustments in Russian economic policy, including punishing corruptions in privatization, curbing illegal plundering by financial oligarchies, and encouraging economic recovery from deep recession. The author also discusses about Russian reform from both theoretical and practical angles, and concludes that Putin's policy failed to address deeper causes of corruption and that Russian economy still faces uncertainty in future.
出处
《杭州师范学院学报(社会科学版)》
2003年第2期25-29,44,共6页
Journal of Hangzhou Teachers College(Humanities and Social Sciences)
关键词
普京
私有化
腐败
金融寡头
产权理论
Putin
privatization
corruption
financial oligarchies
property theory