期刊文献+

虚拟企业合作伙伴投资MIS博弈分析及期权评价 被引量:2

Virtual Enterprise Partners Investing MIS Game Analysis and Option Evaluation
下载PDF
导出
摘要 合作伙伴管理信息系统质量好坏直接影响虚拟企业的运作效率,因此,核心企业一般都要求合作伙伴投资管理信息系统的建设,然而合作伙伴未必有足够积极性,故核心企业有必要通过制度来促使合作伙伴投资建设管理信息系统。本文利用博弈理论建立了核心企业监督合作伙伴投资建设管理信息系统的博弈模型。根据委托—代理理论建立了核心企业激励合作伙伴投资建设管理信息系统的委托—代理模型,与传统的委托—代理模型相比,此模型引入了奖惩函数。最后提出了采用期权定价模型评估管理信息系统投资价值。 The Management Information System (MIS) of partners will affect the efficiency of Virtual Enterprise (VE) directly. So the core enterprise requires partners to invest MIS building. However, partners may not be interested in investing MIS. The core enterprise must spur partners to build MIS by mechanism arrangement. This paper builds a game model of core enterprise monitoring partners' investment, and a principal-agent model of core enterprise encouraging partners' investment. Comparing to traditional model, the rewards & punishments function is introduced in this new model. At last, the option pricing model is adopted to assess MIS investing value.
作者 叶飞 孙东川
出处 《计算机集成制造系统-CIMS》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2003年第4期289-293,304,共6页
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(79931000)。
关键词 虚拟企业 合作伙伴 投资 MIS 管理信息系统 博弈分析 期权评价 virtual enterprise management information system game analysis principal-agent option pricing model
  • 相关文献

参考文献2

二级参考文献11

  • 1[1]Kulatilaka N,Marcus A. Project valuation under uncertainty:when does DCF fail? [J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1992 (3), 92- 100.
  • 2[2]Black F, Scholes M. The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1973,81 (3): 637- 659.
  • 3[3]Myers S C. Determinants of corporate borrowing[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1977(5): 147-175.
  • 4[4]Brennan M,Schwartz E. Evaluating natural resource investment[J]. Journal of Business, 1985,58: 135-157.
  • 5[5]Grenadier S R. Valuing lease contracts:a real-opnons approach[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1995,38(3) :297-331.
  • 6[6]Paddock J,Siegel D,Smith J. Option valuation of claims on physical assets:the cases of offshore petroleum leases[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1988,103(3):479 508.
  • 7[7]Hull J. Options, Futures and Other derivatives Securities[M]. Prentics Hall,1985.
  • 8[8]Trigeorgis L. Real Options in Capital Investment[M]. Praeger Publishers,1995.
  • 9[9]Abel A B. Optimal Investment Under Uncertainty[J]. American Economic Review,1983,73:228-233.
  • 10[10]Cox J C, Ross S A, Rubinstein M. Potion pncing:a simplified approach[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1979(7):229 263.

共引文献51

同被引文献21

  • 1张英朝,张维明,肖卫东,沙基昌.虚拟组织中面向共享的信息统一描述模型研究[J].系统工程学报,2005,20(1):62-72. 被引量:12
  • 2杨善林,刘洋,马溪骏.基于Web Services面向服务架构的虚拟企业解决方案[J].计算机应用研究,2005,22(10):36-38. 被引量:15
  • 3鄢丹.电子政务中的博弈模型分析[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2007,29(8):9-12. 被引量:4
  • 4赵强,肖人彬.虚拟企业信息共享的博弈分析及机制设计研究[J].计算机集成制造系统,2007,13(8):1566-1571. 被引量:13
  • 5Fudenberg D,Jean T.博弈论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.213-371.
  • 6ROVERSO D. Intelligent systems integration: guiding principles examples and lessons learned [ J]. Progress in Nuclear Energy, 2005 (3) : 190 - 205.
  • 7SEGGIE S H, KIM D, CAVUAGIL S T. Do supply chain IT alignment and supply chain interfirm system integration impact upon brand equity and firm performance [ J]. Journal of Business Research, 2006 (59) : 887 - 895.
  • 8CHAN Y E. IT value : the great divide between qualitative and quantitative and individual and organizational measures [ J ]. Journal of Management Information Systems, 2000, 16(4) :225 -261.
  • 9BAHCECI S. The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete [ J ]. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003 (39) : 127 - 134.
  • 10JONES M C, CLINE M,RYAN S. Exploring knowledge sharing in ERP implementation: an organizational culture framework [ J ]. Decision Support Systems, 2006 (41) :411 -434.

引证文献2

二级引证文献10

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部