摘要
对于生产不完全相同产品但存在很大技术相关度的多家企业建立的合资研发中心 ,研发资源的投入方向是各合资伙伴纳什谈判的结果 ,通过构建模型得出结论 :研发资源最优投入策略须满足投入在每个合资伙伴主导知识上的研发资源产生的净边际收益分别等于其净边际成本 ,合资伙伴的自身研发实力、技术对新产品利润的贡献率和销售实力等因素与净边际收益正相关 ,合资伙伴所在产业的技术更新率和净边际成本正相关。企业在组建合资研发中心前 ,须比较它的期望收益和它将来在研发中心的地位所决定的未来收益 ,为企业选择独立研发还是参加合资研发的决策提供依据。
Regarding the RJV that is established by enterprises that produce different products with high technology correlation, using of R&D resource is result of Nash bargaining between partners. Through one model, the conclusion is that the optimal strategy for resource’s investment must satisfy net marginal benefit of investment on dominant knowledge of each partner equals to its net marginal cost. Partners’ own R/D capacity, technology’s contribution to new product’s profit and sales capability have positive relation with net marginal benefit. Innovation rate of related industry’s technology has positive relation with net marginal cost. Before joining RJV, the enterprise must compare its expected benefit with future benefit that is decided by its position within RJV so as to provide basis for decision to join RJV or do R&D independently.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2003年第2期39-42,共4页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (70 2 710 2 5 )
国家自然科学基金优秀群体资助项目 (70 12 10 0 1