摘要
经营者收购作为解决我国国有企业激励不足的一项措施,曾在一些上市公司中试行。然而,我国已有的一些所谓的经营者收购虽能解决经营者的激励问题,却不能解决经营者的约束问题,与真正意义上的经营者收购相差甚远,并导致了有些上市公司与某些机构之间内幕交易和违规行为的发生。尽管造成这种局面有多方面的原因,但经营者收购融资难是其中的一个重要原因。根据我国融资体制状况,一旦该项举措重新推行,由专业化的机构投资者参与的部门经营者收购模式也许是一个较为现实的选择。
Presently the management buyout (MBO), which is regarded as an effective means to resolve incentive aspects in state- owned enterprises, has been put into practice in some listed companies. However, the so-called MBOs in our country are actually different from those in Western countries. Although this kind of MBOs in our country can settle management incentive, it is unable to resolve management discipline, and therefore has resulted in inside deals between some listed companies and institutions and in some acts contrary to rules and regulations. Even though many things account for the situation, the difficulty of financing MBOs under our recent financial system is one of the important reasons. According to our present financial conditions, it might be a realistic choice to promote the MBO of division partaken by some specialized buyout institutions.
出处
《华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第3期107-112,共6页
Journal of East China Normal University(Humanities and Social Sciences)