摘要
文章从哲学视角探讨了物权行为概念、独立性和无因性问题。作者从概念界定的主体价值倾向性入手,深入分析了从内在结构视角界定物权行为概念的意思表示说和意思表示与形式结合说,提出债权行为主义变动模式、物权行为意思主义变动模式和物权行为形式主义变动模式。文章认为物权行为之“因”有内因和外因之别,物权行为是否有因是一个立法政策选择问题,立法者可在內在有因,外在有因;内在无因,外在无因;內在有因,外在无因;内在无因,外在有因的各种结合形态中基于价值衡量,而予不同选择。
It is mainly from the philosophical perspective that this paper explores the definition, independence and non-causality of the juristic act of real right. With an initial discussion of the inclination of the subject' s value, the paper introduces several doctrines of the definition of juristic act of real right from the perspective of external result and inner structureo Moreover, by virtue of the philosophical principle of both content and form and through an analysis of factual behavior and legal behavior, the paper demonstrates that the independence of juristic act of real right is a question of value, not a question of fact, and analyses the independent state of juristic act of real right. The paper maintains that the causes of juristic act of real right fall into two kinds: external and internal, that whether the juristic act of real right stems from causes is a matter of choice for legislation policy, and that the legislators can make different choices on the value-basis.
出处
《上海师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2003年第3期100-105,共6页
Journal of Shanghai Normal University(Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition)