新《劳动合同法》实施对长三角地区劳资收入分配影响的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Influence of Execution of New Labor Contract Law on Employee Income Distribution in Yangtze Delta Area of China

本文运用斯塔克尔贝格博弈模型(Stackel-berg)比较分析了新《劳动合同法》实施前后对长三角地区劳资收入分配可能产生的影响。研究发现,在我国劳动力供给充裕的现实条件下,新《劳动合同法》有其制定和实施的必要性。从长期来看,新《劳动合同法》的实施将有效提高员工工作积极性,提升企业产出水平。同时,新《劳动合同法》的实施有利于促进企业技术创新,引导产业升级。

This paper uses Stackelberg Game Model to analyze influence of execution of New Labor Contract Law on employee income distribution.Result shows that,under the situation of sufficient provision of la- bor in China,there is necessity of constructing and executing New Labor Contract Law.From the long run,execution of New Labor Contract Law will effec- tively improve employee's work will and increase firm's productivity level.In the meantime,execution of New Labor Contract Law will favorably promote firm's technological innovation and lead to industrial upgrade.