人类命运共同体原则下的全球气候博弈分析

An Analysis of Global Climate Negotiations with Social Preferences

国际气候谈判目前已经进行超过20年,随着国际政治体系、经济体系的不断变化,各国之间围绕气候问题的博弈也在不断进行。本文从"人类命运共同体"思想出发,以全球环境谈判模型(IEAs)为基础,引入国家的"社会偏好"这一概念,从利己效用、公平效用和效率效用三个维度建立国家效用函数,从博弈论角度对国家的减排行为进行讨论与分析。研究结论显示:国家的社会偏好对国际气候合作有着显著影响,利己效用对合作减排产生不利影响,公平效用对合作减排的影响存在不确定性,而效率效用对合作减排产生有利影响,参与减排的国家数量越多越有利于提升减排水平。另外,惩罚机制的存在可以有效遏制搭便车及偷懒行为,进而促进合作减排。最后,本文结合目前国际气候博弈格局分析中国的定位,对我国如何参与国际气候谈判和制定能源经济政策提出对策和建议。

International climate negotiations have been going on for more than 20 years. With the changes of international politics and economic systems,the game between countries on climate issues is continuing. This paper starts with the idea of 'A human community of common destiny'and bases on the International Environment Agreement Model( IEAs),introduces the concept of'national social preferences',uses self-interest utility,fair utility and efficiency utility to establish the national utility function. The national emission reduction behavior is discussed and analyzed from the perspective of game theory. The conclusion reveals that the country’s social preferences indeed have a significant impact on international climate cooperation. The effect of self-interest utility and efficiency utility has an adverse impact on cooperation and emission reduction. The effect of fair utility is uncertain,but the effect of efficiency utility is active. The more countries participate in emission reduction,the more benefit it is. In addition,the existence of a punishment mechanism can effectively curb free riders and lazy behavior. Finally,this paper analyzes China’s positioning based on the current pattern of international climate game,and puts forward some suggestions for China to participate in international climate negotiations and formulate energy economic policies.