技术治官下的剩余信息生产权博弈——以环境空气质量监测为例

Gaming on the Residual Control Right of Information Production during the Age of Disciplining Officials with Technology:As Case Study of Environmental Air Quality Monitoring

本文试图从信息控制权的视角探讨技术治官的实践。借鉴"控制权"的分析框架,我们将信息控制权分为信息激励权、信息解释权和信息生产权三个维度。随着统计、文档、制图、信息通讯等技术的发展和集成使用,中央政府在一些重要的任务环境中,基本掌握了信息的激励权和解释权,并极大地提高了信息生产的能力。但信息生产权一方面受制于技术,另一方面容易为地方政府的行动所影响。因而,尽管中央政府采取技术压缩地方政府在信息生产上的空间,地方政府依然可以争取"剩余信息生产权"。本文以环境空气质量监测为例,指出在强激励、不可解释的任务情境下,地方政府会采取各种策略,与中央政府就剩余信息生产权展开或明或暗的博弈。本文认为,"技术治官"的效果不仅有赖技术本身,还取决于作为"行动者"的地方政府的回应。

This paper explores the practice of disciplining officials with technology through the perspective of information control rights. In light of the analytical framework of 'control rights',we collapse information control rights into three categories: the right to provide what incentives,the right to interpret,and the right of information production. With the development of forms of technology in statistics,documentation,cartography,and info-communication,the central government has practically controlled the right to provide what incentives and the right to interpret in some important tasks,and it has also greatly enhanced its capacity of information production. Controlling the right of information production,however,depends on the strategic actions of local governments as well as application of technology. As a result,local governments can enjoy some 'residual control right of information production'even if the central government,resorting to use of technology,has been trying to squeeze their room of information production. In this paper,we argue that when executing tasks that the central government has full control of rights in incentive provision and information interpretation,local governments may try various strategies to fight for residual control right of information production,overtly or covertly. We conclude that the effect of 'disciplining officials with technology'depends not only on technology itself,but also on responses of local governments as a strategic actor.