中国地方政府性债务形成机制的动态分析——基于审计报告的研究

A Dynamic Analysis of the Formation Mechanism of the Chinese Local Government Debt: A Research Based on Audit Reports

基于审计署地方政府性债务的审计报告,利用动态不一致的博弈模型,分析我国地方政府性债务出现和膨胀原因,结果显示中央政府默许了地方政府的借债行为,而且当地方政府出现债务危机时中央政府的救助概率较大,加之惩罚约束机制的缺乏,导致地方政府性债务出现并持续扩张。调整分税制财政管理体制,完善地方政府的债务管理制度,加强基层地方政府性债务的审计、监管和风险评估,将对地方政府性债务的扩张及其风险形成有效的约束。

By using a dynamic inconsistency game model,this paper,based on two audit reports,explains the emergence and expansion of China's local government debt. The research shows that central government acknowledged the bonds issuing behavior of local government,and the possibility of bailing local government in debt crisis is high,together with the lack of punishment constraint mechanism,result in the emergence and expansion of China's local government debt. Adjusting tax-sharing system,perfecting local government debt management system and fostering local government debt audit,monitor and risk evaluation will form effective constraint on the expansion and risk of local government debt.