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资产的不同分类与权利配置 被引量:1

Capital's different sorts and power distribution
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摘要 在传统的产权经济学中,认为企业资源所具有专用性的大小是企业权利的源泉,企业的控制权应当由重要的专用性资产的所有者掌握。这一论点引起了诸多争议,从资产专用性、依赖性、惟一性分类的角度出发,企业权利的配置需要进行进一步探讨。
作者 王文创
机构地区 南开大学经济系
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第6期14-16,20,共4页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
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参考文献9

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同被引文献39

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