期刊文献+

转型时期乡村组织行为与乡镇企业发展 被引量:11

Behavior of Rural Organizations and Development of Township and Village Enterprises during the Transitional Period
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摘要 乡镇企业一直运行在市场和政治制度不完善的环境中 ,这期间乡村组织拥有获取要素、组织交易和规避风险的权力资本。这些权力资本必须与企业家人力资本结合才能实现其价值。同样 ,企业家也必须有乡村组织的保护才能将企业经营成功。权力资本与人力资本形成套住效应 ,成为关系专用性投资极强的资产。本文认为 ,乡村组织和企业家将选择总体上投资扭曲最少、盈余最多的合作方式。因为不同地区乡村组织所控制的资源不一样 ,而且不同行业对权力资本与企业家人力资本有不同需求 ,于是 ,现实中的乡镇企业就有集体所有制与私有制之别。集体产权安排不仅在一定时期内有效 ,而且私有制和集体所有制乡镇企业将会在长时期内并存。 Township and village enterprises (TVEs) have been operating in imperfect market and political systems in the period of transition. During this period, rural organizations have capital in the form of power to acquire factors, organize transactions and evade risks. Only when combined with the manpower capital of entrepreneurs can power capital realize its value. Similarly, only under an umbrella of protection can an entrepreneur successfully run his enterprise. Power capital and manpower capital are locked in a mutual benefit relationship. In their cooperation, rural organizations and entrepreneurs choose the form with the least distortion of investment and the maximum profit. As rural organizations in different areas possess different resources, and as industries vary as to their need for power capital and manpower capital, the TVEs are divided into two forms: collective and private. Collective ownership will remain for a rather long period of time, and private and collective TVEs will exist side by side into the long future.
作者 谭秋成
出处 《中国社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第2期72-83,共12页 Social Sciences in China
基金 农业部软科学基金委员会
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参考文献30

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