国有银行的存差:逻辑与性质

Deposit-loan Difference with State-owned Banks: Logic and Nature

本文旨在构建考察国有银行存差逻辑及性质的新视角和新框架 ,并试图透过这种框架进一步窥探国有银行制度的未知结构。本文讨论的逻辑次序是 ,首先借用了Mishkin假设的银行资产负债表并将其扩展形式应用于对国有银行情形的解释 ,在此过程中凸显的问题饶有意味 :国有银行比一般商业银行需要更多的存款。究其原因 ,国有银行的特殊资本结构使其存款一直充当着弥补资本金不足的角色。在此基础上 ,本文提出并证明了三个重要命题。第一个命题表明 ,在国家声誉入股的场合 ,国有银行的存款需求是一般商业银行的两倍。国家声誉入股意味着国家要对存款的流动性负最后责任 ,在这种情况下 ,国有银行吸收存款就等于是在获取免费资本 ,因此也就具有更大的提供存单激励。第二个命题刻画出 ,国有银行比一般商业银行拥有更大的信贷提供能力。在国有经济需要国有银行提供更多信贷支持的背景下 ,国有银行拥有一个大致均衡的资产负债结构 ,其存款相对于贷款也就不会显得过多。可是 ,由于金融风险为国有银行的信贷扩展设置了最远边界 ,因此信贷约束政策的实施难以避免。当继续增加的存款不再有更多的贷款追逐时 ,存差就会合乎逻辑地出现。第三个命题揭示了 ,国有银行的存差导因于国家长期实行的金融控制及其相应的制度安排 。

The paper intends to explore the logic behind the increasing deposit-loan difference with state-owned banks (SOBs) and to establish a framework, which provides a revealing insight into the nature of SOBs. It puts forward three arguments. Firstly, with state reputation functioning as their capital, the demand for deposit by SOBs is twice as much as that by commercial banks. Secondly, SOBs have a greater capacity for loan arrangement than commercial banks. Thirdly, the deposit-loan difference is the natural consequence of a deliberate institutional design rather than the result of credit constraint.