不完全信息、信念与博弈均衡——伊拉克武器核查危机的一个博弈论解释

Imperfect Information,Belief and Game Equilibrium:A Game Theory Explanation of the Iraq Weapons Inspection

本文在一个双方不完全信息的框架下分析了伊拉克武器核查危机中美伊的战略选择 ,认为在单阶博弈中 ,伊拉克武器核查危机博弈的均衡解取决于博弈双方对对方政府类型的判断。在多阶博弈中 ,如果伊拉克的大规模杀伤性武器发展计划对美国全球利益的影响足够小的情况下 ,{拒绝接受联合国武器核查 ,不进行军事打击 }将成为多阶博弈的均衡解 ,但美国仍然可以通过增加沉没成本的策略性行为来改变自己的不利局面。在更一般的情况下 ,{接受联合国武器核查 ,不进行军事打击 }将是模型的稳定均衡解。文章最后还研究了在何种情况下美国强硬政府声誉的建立有利于美国的国家利益。

Based on an imperfect information game model,this paper analyzes the strategic choices made by America and Iraq in the Iraq weapons inspection crisis.In a single stage game,the game equilibrium depends on one player's perception of the type of the other's government.In a dynamic game,if Iraq chooses'to refuse weapons inspection'and America chooses'not to attack Iraq'equilibrium will be reached when the outcomes of Iraq's plan to develop weapons of mass destruction will have little effect on America's global benefits.In spite of this,America can ameliorate the adverse situation by increasing the sunk costs.In a more common situation,if Iraq chooses'to accept weapons inspection'and America chooses 'not to attack Iraq'equilibrium will be reached.The paper also discusses the situation in which the establishment of a reputation for a strong government in America will be beneficial to its national interests.