利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构

Bargaining among the Stakeholders and Corporate Governance

企业的契约性与利益相关者理论具有一致性 ,它们都隐含了企业是一种再谈判机制。利益相关者对企业的所有权分配进行谈判 ,谈判结果决定出企业的治理结构。在这个过程中 ,各方的谈判破裂结果效用、谈判力和对谈判破裂的担心程度是关键变量。我们使用Nash谈判模型及其推广模型分析了这个过程。我们的结论是 ,企业治理结构是内生的 ,每个企业的治理结构都是特殊的个案 ,一种治理结构并不具有普适性。这个结论具有重要的立法含义。

The contract nature of the firm proves to be consistence with stakeholder theory. This implies that the firm is a re-bargaining mechanism. The stakeholders bargain for the ownership of the firm, and the outcome of the bargaining determines the governance of the firm. In this process, each party's utility payoffs corresponding to disagreement outcome, bargaining power and fear of disagreement are the key variables. We use Nash Bargaining Model and its extended version to analyze this process. Our conclusion is that corporate governance is endogenous, each one is a special case, and one kind of governance pattern may not be universe. This conclusion has important legal implications.