摘要
从博弈论中委托-代理理论出发,分析了政府R&D资源分配和使用中的博弈关系,并以此为基础对政府R&D资源管理的策略进行探讨,提出了完善委托人约束机制、代理人激励机制和研究质量评价机制的若干观点。
According to principal-agent theory,it has analyzed the game relations during the course of distribution and usage of government R&D resources. Based on this it has discussed management tactics about R&D resources from government,and put forward some proposals for the improvement of principal-restrained,agent-promoted and research-evaluated mechanisms.
出处
《研究与发展管理》
CSSCI
2003年第3期13-16,共4页
R&D Management
