摘要
动态联盟组盟阶段成员存在信息隐藏问题。通过分析盟员信息隐瞒的概率与盟主对其信任程度之间的关系,指出有效地设计激励机制信息隐瞒的必要性。对于风险中性的成员,通过一般方法,给出了多项式形式的评分规则的确定方法,在这种规则下,成员将最大程度地如实反映自己的信息。
when constructing virtual enterprise, there is information concealing between members and the sponsor. The relation between members' probabilities of information concealing and the sponsor's belief to them has been analyzed. A quadratic evaluation rule is given, under which members will give their information truthfully.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2003年第3期102-105,共4页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家863/CIMS主题资助项目(2001AA411340)
