基于不完全信息静态博弈论的购电商竞价策略研究

Buyer's bidding strategies based on the static game theory with incomplete information

分析了发、配电同时开放条件下电力市场竞价的基本过程。根据不完全信息静态博弈的基本理论,提出了购电商在信息不完全条件下参与竞价的最优报价策略。引入变量ε解决了购电商对市场清算电价的评价与市场对其评价不一致的问题。对购电商存在单一支付函数和多个支付函数的不同情况,分别推导了购电商竞价的纯战略和混合战略。还就一个简化模型分别给出了购电商采用纯战略报价和混合战略报价的具体算法。通过算例验证了采用该方法进行购电报价的实用性和有效性。

The bidding process of electricity auction market with the der eg ulation of both genera-tion side and distribution side is studied.Several opti mal bidding strategies from a buyer’s point of view are also presented,which are based on the static game theory with incomplete information.For the differ ence between buyers and market in evaluating the market-clearing price,a varia ble錳s introduced.According to buyer’s different pay off functions,pure str ategies and mixed strategies are developed respectively.The bidding strategies for a supposed simplified market model are given.The simulative results show th e correctness and feasibility of the proposed methods.