供应链中的道德风险问题

Moral Hazard Problem in Supply Chain

研究了道德风险环境下供应链的质量投资决策问题,在B.Stanley所建立的供应商和购买商签约模型基础上,把供应商作为委托人和购买商作为代理人,同时考虑供应商和购买商收益的个人理性约束条件,建立了道德风险环境下供应链的质量投资决策模型,并进行了优化求解·最后,结合农机公司某种零件加工的道德风险问题进行了仿真计算·结果表明,在道德风险环境下购买商的质量评价投资水平和加工水平及供应商的生产投资水平都偏离了对称信息下的决策结果,其原因在于供应商的内部质量保证支付和外部质量保证支付不同·

Quality investment problem in supply chain under moral hazard condition was studied. Based on B.Stanleys contracting model for a supplier and a buyer, a quality investment decision model with the supplier as principal and the buyer as agent was set up by consideration of the suppliers and the buyers individual rational limitations. The model under moral hazard environment was optimized subsequently. At last, simulation was done on the moral hazard problem of component processing in an agricultural machines company. The results indicate that the quality investment and processing level for the buyer and the production investment level for the supplier under moral hazard condition are deviated from the decisions under symmetric information. The deviation is caused by difference between internal payment and external payment from the supplier.