摘要
日本发动九一八事变后,苏联对事变实行中立的不干涉政策,主要出于国家战略利益的考虑,即力图为其赢得一个相对和平的外部环境。不干涉政策的策略意义在于避免卷入对日冲突,不给日本制造事端提供口实,同时又可利用它作为同日本进行外交斗争的工具。但苏联在实行不干涉政策时是把中立与道义相区分的,政策上表现为中立,道义上却体现出对中国抗日军民的同情。不干涉政策的实质是一种妥协,这本身无可非议。但苏联对日妥协中有损及中国主权的因素,使不干涉政策偏离了正确轨道。不干涉政策具有复杂性,但不能得出苏联鼓励日本侵略中国的结论。
On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Imperialists invaded and occupied Shenyang. Considering its strategic interests , the Soviet Union carried oirt the neutral policy of noninterference to this incident. But in the course of practising this policy, the Soviet Union showed moral sympathy for Chinese armymen and people. Although the policy of noninterference was a compromise above criticism, it still impaired China's sovereignty. Although the policy of noninterference had complexities, we couldn't draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union encouraged the Japanese to invade China.
出处
《中共党史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第3期39-45,共7页
CPC History Studies