生产能力无限时逢低买入与固定价格机制的比较

The Comparison of Group-buying Auction and Fixed-pricing Mechanism with Infinite Supply

逢低买入是一种新型的基于网络的动态价格机制,它通过联合单个消费者形成规模来获得价格折扣。作为双向拍卖的一种变体,逢低买入的适用条件是亟待研究的问题。本文通过研究存在规模效应的前提下,当商家能够完全满足消费者的需求时,采用逢低买入拍卖所能获得的收益情况,证明了在这种情况下逢低买入将会绝对优于固定价格机制,从而表明逢低买入适用于这种环境。

Group-buying auction is a new kind of dynamic pricing mechanisms on the InternetThis mechanism makes the bidders as a group through Internet to get the volume discountsAs a variant of double auction,what condition Group-buying suits is not clear and is valuable to studyThis paper analyzed the seller's profit for the group-buying auction when the economies of scale are considered,and proved that the group-buying auction will overmatch the fixed-pricing mechanism if the seller can always satisfy the bidders' demand,which provides the Group-buying auction a suitable point