商业银行信息披露监控机制的构建研究

Research on Monitoring Mechanism Design of Information Disclosure in Commercial Bank

商业银行充分有效的信息披露是进一步完善市场经济机制、强化对银行的市场约束,提高金融透明度的必然要求,也是国际银行监管发展的趋势。运用博弈论与信息经济学的原理,研究商业银行信息披露监控中的一阶段博弈和多阶段的重复博弈问题。根据博弈结果,认为按既定的行为规则下设计信息披露监控机制,可以构成稳定的均衡,博弈的双方都有遵守机制的内在动力。

Consummating market economy mechanism and strengthening marketable restriction with commercial banks to increase diaphaneity of banking require a sufficient information disclosure in commercial banks,which is a certain tendency of international banking monitoringAccording as game theory and information economics,the paper researches 1-stage game and T-stages repeated games of information disclosure monitoring in commercial banks,and it is concluded that a stable game equilibrium will be composed and players will obey the mechanism when information disclosure monitoring mechanism is constructed according to established action rules