一种激励相容的电力市场可中断负荷管理合同模型

AN INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE CONTRACT FOR INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD MANAGEMENT IN ELECTRICITY MARKET

电力市场环境下 ,电力公司与用户之间存在的信息不对称性可能会导致可中断负荷管理的低效。文中提出了一种激励相容的可中断负荷管理合同模型 ,可引导用户自愿披露真实缺电成本信息。该模型能考虑用户的最大可中断负荷限制 ,并能适用于负荷中断分配的不同优化目标 ,如电力公司利润最大或用户缺电成本最小等。采用蒙特卡洛模拟方法的算例表明了该模型的有效性。

In electricity market, the informational asymmetries between utilities and customers may cause inefficiencies in interruptible load management. An incentive compatible contract model is developed for interruptible load management, which can lead customers to voluntarily reveal their true outage costs information. The proposed model allows customers having maximum interruptible load constraints to be taken into account and can apply to different optimization objectives for dispatching the interruptible customers, such as maximizing the utility's benefit or minimizing the total outage cost of customers. A numerical example using Monte Carlo simulation method is presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model.