从激励悖论看企业的监督机制

Study on Supervision Mechanism from Paradox of Motivation

文章从企业的监督机制入手,用博弈论中的“激励悖论”来分析企业中监督者与被监督者的关系,解释了单一的严惩被监督者的犯错行为或加强对监督者的处罚力度都不能有效减少企业内部犯错事件发生的原因,并提出了解决该问题的合理建议。

The paper aims at analyzing the relations of the supervisors and th e controlled in an enterprise by the supervision mechanism and the paradox of mo tivation in game theory,stating the reasons why an enterprise can not reduce the mistakes by which it penalty only the mistakes of the controlled or only of the supervisors,and putting forward some suggestions for it.