摘要
腐败现象正从政治、经济、金融领域向学术界蔓延。打击腐败固然能惩前毖后 ,但成本过高。激励相容的激励机制尤为可取。本文运用代理理论建立大学与教师之间的非合作博弈模型。模型的次优解表明 ,信息不对称下学术腐败问题的发生存在一定的必然性。
Corruption is occurred in economic area, financial area, and even research field. As one of the most used tool to fight against corruption, the cost of monitoring is too high. Incentive compatible incentive scheme is suggested in this paper. In the framework of Principal-Agent, via building a non-cooperative game model to study the factors which have great impact on the existence of corruption, this paper gives some suggestion for the pre-guarding of corruption. Finally, the innovation of compensation scheme in research-oriented universities is proposed.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第4期15-21,共7页
Science Research Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学"十五"规划研究课题<基于绩效评价的研究型高校薪酬制度再设计研究>资助 (项目编号0 1JC63 0 0 0 3 )
