期刊文献+

环境政策决定过程中的公共选择 被引量:2

Public Choices in the Decision Process of Environmental Policy
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摘要 本文试图运用博弈理论,通过建立一个简单的游说-竞选模型,来分析西方国家的环境政策与其所特有的政治制度之间的关系。得出的结论是,西方国家的环境政策之所以较多地采用数量管制这一手段,是因为在其所谓的民主制度下,政治家与利益集团之间形成的一种政治均衡所致。由此,我们认为,西方政治模式下的环境政策,很难达到社会福利的最大化。所以,在借鉴国外包括环境政策在内的许多政策时,必须考虑到各个国家的政治背景,才能制定出真正适合我国国情、符合广大人民利益的政策。 This text attempts to use gametheory to study the relationship between the environmental policies and the particular political institution of western countries through setting up a simple lobbyingelectoral competition model.It reaches the conclusion that the quantity control is more adopoted in the environmental policies of western countries ,because in the socalled democratic institution,it is formed by a kind of political equilibrium between statesmen and interest groups.Therefore,it holds that it is very difficult for the environmental policy in the western political model to reach the maximization of social welfare.It is impossible to formulate an effective environmental policy unless a state power which really accords with the interests of people is established.
作者 宋健敏
出处 《财经研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第8期22-27,共6页 Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词 负的外部性 价格管制 数量管制 环境政策 博弈理论 公共选择 lobbying-electoral competition model the price control quantity control
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参考文献5

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同被引文献18

  • 1王进明,胡欣.贸易与环境关联问题的博弈分析[J].财经问题研究,2005(12):91-95. 被引量:17
  • 2金通.环境管理动力差异的博弈论解释及其含义[J].统计与决策,2006,22(1):34-35. 被引量:1
  • 3李仁安,黄轶芳.“公共地悲剧”的博弈分析[J].商业研究,2006(7):82-84. 被引量:9
  • 4R. Govindasamy, J. Herriges and J. Shogren (1994) "Nonpoint Tournaments" Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation: Issues and Analysis, Amsterdam.
  • 5B. Govindasamy, J. Herriges and J. Shogren (1994) "Nonpoint Tournaments" Nonpomt Source Pollution Regulation: Issues and Analysis, Amsterdamo.
  • 6A. Xepapadeas (1991) "Environmental Policy Under Imperfect Information: Incentives and Moral. Flazqrd", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Issue 200.
  • 7Kydland F. , Prescott E. , " Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optional Plans" [ J ]. Jour- nal of Political Economy, 1997o.
  • 8Drazen A., Masson P., "Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Polieymakers" [ R]. NBER Working Pa- per, No. 4448. , 19930.
  • 9Govindasamy R. , Herriges J. and Shogren J. , "Nonpoint Tournaments"[ J]. Nonpoint Source,Pollution Regulation: Issues and Analysis, Amsterdam, 19940.
  • 10Xepapadeas A. , "Environmental Policy under Im- perfect Information: Incentives and Moral ~,~Txrd" [ J ]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Issue 20, 19910.

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